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Abstract 
Human capital theory is the dominant approach for understanding personal income 
distribution. According to this theory, individual income is the result of “human capital”. 
The idea is that human capital makes people more productive, which leads to higher 
income. But is this really the case? This paper takes a critical look at human capital 
theory and its explanation of personal income distribution. I find that human capital 
theory’s claims are dubious at best. In most cases, the theory is either not supported 
by evidence, is so vague that it is untestable, or is based on circular reasoning. In 
short, human capital theory is a barrier to the scientific study of income distribution.
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1.  Introduction 
 
Human capital theory is the dominant approach for understanding personal income 
distribution. According to this theory, individual income is the result of ‘human capital’. The 
idea is that human capital makes people more productive, which leads to higher income. But 
is this really the case? This paper takes a critical look at human capital theory and its 
explanation of personal income distribution. I find that human capital theory’s claims are 
dubious at best. In most cases, human capital theory is either not supported by evidence, is 
so vague that it is untestable, or is based on circular reasoning. In short, human capital theory 
is a barrier to the scientific understanding of income distribution. 
 
Human capital theory’s causal chain 
 
 
 
My discussion is organized around human capital theory’s causal chain, shown above. What I 
hope to show is that this causal chain is deeply flawed and is contradicted by the available 
evidence. 
 
After a brief review of the origins of human capital theory (Section 2), I investigate the link 
between productivity and income (Section 3). Scores of empirical investigations have 
purported to find evidence for such a link. The problem is that they are all based on circular 
logic. They find a link between productivity and income because they measure productivity in 
terms of income. But when productivity is measured objectively using physical units, the link 
between income and productivity becomes tenuous. I find that productivity differences 
between workers are too small to explain observed levels of income inequality. A further 
problem is that productivity may not even be an “individual trait”, as human capital theory 
claims. Evidence from animal studies suggest that social setting can affect individual 
productivity. In other words, productivity can be a ‘social trait’. 
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After finding little evidence for the productivity-income hypothesis, I look for a relation 
between human capital and income (Section 4). I find that this leads to a Catch-22 situation. If 
we use an expansive definition of human capital, objective measurement becomes virtually 
impossible. But if we use a restrictive definition (that is measurable), we can account for only 
a small fraction of income variation. Proponents of human capital theory often use a bait 
switch technique. They begin with an expansive definition of human capital that is 
unmeasurable. But when it comes time to justify the theory, they point to the (very modest) 
empirical success of a narrow definition of human capital. The form of human capital that is 
most often trumpeted is education. The problem is that education’s effect on income appears 
to be dwarfed by the effect of hierarchical rank. 
 
In Section 5, I consider the possibility that hierarchical rank is just a potent form of human 
capital. But this hypothesis has a key deficiency. Hierarchical income gains are far larger than 
the observed differences in human productivity. But if not productivity, then what explains 
income returns to hierarchical rank? It is here that human capital theory becomes a barrier to 
scientific progress. When we assume that income is caused by characteristics of the 
individual, we fail to consider the obvious alternative. What if individual income has a social 
cause? In a hierarchy, the most obvious social cause is the chain of command, which is 
effectively a tool for concentrating power. What if power explains the returns to hierarchical 
rank? I find evidence to support this hypothesis. Relative income within firms scales strongly 
with the number of subordinates (which I take to be a measure of hierarchical power). 
 
I conclude in Section 6 with thoughts about future directions for income distribution theory. If 
we abandon human capital theory, what should we replace it with? I think we should focus on 
the power relations within social hierarchy. Hopefully this will allow us to move forward from 
the half-century dead-end that has been human capital theory. 
 
 
2.  Human capital theory’s origins 
 
Human capital theory originated in the mid-20
th
 century work of Mincer (1958), Schultz (1961), 
and Becker (1962). These authors proposed a remarkably simple explanation of personal 
income. The idea is that individuals can gain skills (human capital) that will make them more 
productive. This enhanced productivity then leads to greater income. As I discuss below, this 
was not a new idea. The main accomplishment of human capital theory was to make this 
vision consistent with the rest of neoclassical theory. 
 
In many ways, human capital theory was an inevitable byproduct of a century of political 
economic thought. The key ingredient was the deep-rooted productivity-income hypothesis. 
The idea that income stems from productivity has been a central tenet of political economy for 
more than a century. It was formalized in neoclassical theory by Wicksteed (1894) and Clark 
(1899). Both authors theorized that income distribution obeyed a “natural law”. In a market 
economy, each factor of production would earn its marginal product. This was the incremental 
increase in output caused by the incremental increase in input of capital/labor. Thus, if a 
capitalist earned more than a worker, it was because an additional unit of ‘capital’ added more 
to output than an additional unit of labor. 
 
Marginal productivity theory was developed to explain functional income distribution – the 
income split between workers and capitalists. But it logically implies a theory of personal 
income distribution. Let’s suppose that the productivity-income relation is universal. It follows 
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that income differences between workers (who all earn labor income) must be due to 
differences in individual productivity. In hindsight, the development of human capital theory 
was only a matter of time. According to neoclassical theory, capitalist income stems from the 
productivity of capital. Maybe something similar is true for workers? This was the hypothesis 
proposed by Mincer, Schultz, and Becker. Suddenly we could think of “skills” as “human 
capital”, just like we could think of machinery as “capital”. Wage differences between workers 
could then be attributed to differences in “human capital”. 
 
Incidentally, neoclassical thinkers were not the only ones to arrive at this conclusion. Some 
Marxists had very similar ideas. On the face of it, Marxist theory is diametrically opposed to 
neoclassical theory. Marx (1867) thought that capitalists earned their income by exploiting 
workers. This was very different from the neoclassical vision of class harmony. But what 
about income differences between workers? Here, Marxist theory and human capital theory 
are not that far apart. According to Marx, labor produces all value. But this implies that high-
paid skilled workers must be more productive than low-paid unskilled workers. What accounts 
for these productivity differences? According to the Soviet economist Isaak Illich Rubin 
(1973), it is the additional training of skilled workers that makes them more productive. This 
thinking is virtually identical to human capital theory. 
 
Thus, the productivist tendencies of political economy naturally led to some form of human 
capital theory. But there is a major sticking point to this approach. If income is caused by 
productivity, then human productivity must be as unequally distributed as income (or nearly 
so). But this possibility was challenged by the work of Francis Galton and Vilfredo Pareto. 
Galton (1869) discovered that human characteristics were normally distributed. No matter 
what was measured (height, weight, IQ, etc.), human characteristics tended to clump around 
an average value. It follows that human productivity should also be normally distributed. The 
problem is that income bucks this trend. Vilfredo Pareto (1897) showed that income 
distributions were highly skewed. Income was far more unequally distributed than were 
human characteristics. Political economists have been grappling with this paradox for a 
century (Sahota, 1978). 
 
The most common resolution to the Galton-Pareto paradox is to assume that abilities have a 
multiplicative effect on productivity (Boissevain, 1939; Mandelbrot, 1960). Human abilities 
remain normally distributed, thus satisfying Galton’s findings. At the same time, the 
multiplicative effect means that productivity can be highly skewed. This satisfies Pareto’s 
findings. This thinking is often expressed as a production function. Workers’ output (Y) is 
written as an exponential function of the sum of different abilities (ai): 
 
         (1) 
 
This thinking begs a question. Are abilities innate? Or are they learned? Human capital theory 
asserts that most abilities are learned. But this has been a major source of controversy. 
According to ‘screening’ theory, education does not increase ability. Instead, education simply 
sorts individuals by their pre-existing abilities (Spence, 1978; Hungerford and Solon, 1987). 
 
While historically important, I find this ‘screening’ debate largely irrelevant. The important 
question is not whether abilities are innate or acquired. Instead, the important question is – 
can productivity differences explain income differences? If not, then both screening theory 
and human capital theory have a serious problem. 
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3.  Productivity and income 
 
Any theory worth its salt must make falsifiable predictions. Human capital theory’s prediction 
is unambiguous: workers’ income stems from productivity. Unfortunately testing this prediction 
leads to a measurement quagmire from which few economists escape. 
 
3.1  A measurement quagmire 
 
To measure a worker’s marginal productivity, we must isolate the change in a firm’s output 
that is due to the change in labor input alone. In most situations, this is virtually impossible 
(Pullen, 2009). For instance, we must be able to objectively measure the quantity of capital, in 
order to hold it constant. But as the “Cambridge capital controversy” showed, we cannot 
measure the quantity of capital independently from the distribution of income (Cohen and 
Harcourt, 2003; Hodgson, 2005; Nitzan and Bichler, 2009; Robinson, 1953; Sraffa, 1960). 
Since it is the distribution of income that we wish to explain, this is a bit of a problem. 
 
We must also be able to objectively measure output. But how do we compare workers who 
have qualitatively different outputs? For instance, how can we determine if a potato farmer is 
more productive than a composer? Neoclassical theory solves the problem by slight of hand. 
It assumes a one-commodity economy, in which output comparison problems do not exist 
(Colacchio, 2018). 
 
But applied economists cannot be content with this approach. Real-world tests of marginal 
productivity theory require comparing workers with different outputs. This means choosing a 
common quantitative attribute of analysis. But the choice of attribute is subjective, and 
different attributes will lead to different results. Economists make things worse by choosing 
monetary value as the attribute of comparison. Thus, labor productivity is generally measured 
using sales or value-added per worker (Abowd et al., 1999; Haltiwanger et al., 1999; Haskel 
et al., 2005; Hellerstein et al., 1996; Hoegeland, 1999; Iranzo et al., 2008; Oulton, 1998). The 
problem with this approach is that it relies on circular logic. According to theory, income is 
explained by productivity. But when the theory is tested, productivity is defined in terms of 
income. 
 
Based purely on accounting principles, we expect wages to be correlated with sales/value-
added per worker. Double entry accounting principles dictate that firm value added (Y) is 
equivalent to the sum of all wages (W) and capitalist income (K). If we divide by the number of 
workers (L), we find that value-added per worker is equivalent to the average wage (w = W/L) 
plus K/L: 
 
        (2) 
 
Sales (S) are similar, but include an additional non-labor cost term (C): 
 
 
       (3) 
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Figure 1 Labor productivity inequality vs. income inequality  
Note: Using a Gini index, this figure compares the inequality of worker productivity to income inequality 
within nation-states. Data for worker productivity dispersion comes from Hunter et al. (1990), who report 
the coefficient of variation of productivity among workers conducting the same task. Data plotted here 
shows the distribution of productivity inequality for 52 different tasks. I convert Hunter’s data to a Gini 
index by assuming that worker productivity is lognormally distributed. The Gini index (G) of a lognormal 
distribution with a coefficient of variation cv is 
 .  
I plot the resulting distribution against the distribution of Gini indexes of income inequality for all country-
year observations in the World Bank database (series SI.POV.GINI). 
 
 
 
Thus, if we look for a correlation between average wage (w) and value-added/sales per 
worker (Y/L or S/L), we will surely find it. Simple accounting definitions dictate that average 
wage is a major component of value-added per worker. 
 
3.2  Measuring productivity differences objectively 
 
Under what conditions can we objectively compare differences in workers’ output? The 
conditions are extremely restrictive. We can only compare workers who produce the same 
output. Most economists have not been interested in such measurements. However, the 
psychologist John E. Hunter made it part of his life’s work. Hunter et al. (1990) report output 
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variability among workers doing the same task. Importantly, many different types of tasks are 
measured. 
 
The question is, how great is this output variability? Can it conceivably account for observed 
levels of income inequality? I test this possibility in Figure 1. For each of the 52 different tasks 
measured by Hunter et al., I calculate a Gini index of productivity inequality. I then plot the 
spread of this labor productivity inequality. The results cluster around a Gini index of 0.1. 
Interestingly, this is consistent with the known dispersion of human abilities. For instance, we 
can take the SAT test as one measure of human ability. In 2017, the average score on the US 
SAT was 1060, and the standard deviation was 195 (CollegeBoard, 2017). Assuming a 
normal distribution, this corresponds to a distribution of ability with a Gini index of 0.1. 
 
How does this productivity dispersion compare to levels of income inequality? To make this 
comparison, Figure 1 plots the distribution of income inequality within all nation-states in the 
World Bank database. The results do not bode well for human capital theory. Productivity 
inequality is far too small to account for observed levels of income inequality. 
 
3.3  Is productivity an “individual trait”? 
 
Let’s be generous to human capital theory and put aside this under-explanation problem. 
Let’s suppose that productivity inequality is similar to income inequality. Even then, there is a 
problem with the productivity-income hypothesis. Human capital theory assumes that 
productivity is an individual trait. But this could be wrong. Individual productivity could be a 
social trait. 
 
Experiments by the poultry geneticist William Muir highlight this possibility. Muir conducted 
selective-breeding experiments that attempted to raise chickens’ egg-laying productivity. In 
one experiment, Muir selected the most productive hen from each group to breed the next 
generation of hens. What happened? Evolutionary biologist David Sloan Wilson summarizes: 
 
“Egg productivity plummeted, even though the best egg-layers had been 
selected each and every generation. The reason for this perverse outcome is 
easy to understand, at least in retrospect. The most productive hen in each 
cage was the biggest bully, who achieved her productivity by suppressing the 
productivity of the other hens” (Muir and Wilson, 2016, emphasis added). 
 
The lesson, according to Wilson, is that traits that can be “measured at the individual level” 
may not actually be “individual traits”: 
 
“Muir’s experiments ... challenge what it means for a trait to be regarded as 
an individual trait. If by ‘individual trait’ we mean a trait that can be measured 
in an individual, then egg productivity in hens qualifies. You just count the 
number of eggs that emerge from the hind end of a hen. If by ‘individual trait’ 
we mean the process that resulted in the trait, then egg productivity in hens 
does not qualify. Instead, it is a social trait that depends not only on the 
properties of the individual hen but also on the properties of the hen’s social 
environment” (Muir and Wilson, 2016). 
 
Human capital theory makes a seemingly self-evident assumption: the productivity of 
individuals is an “individual trait”. But as Wilson notes, this is faulty logic. When we study 
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productivity differences among humans, we must consider the social context. Just as with 
hens, highly productive humans may actually be suppressing the productivity of others. This 
behavior would invalidate the premise of human capital theory (and much of neoclassical 
economics). 
 
 
4.  Human capital and income 
 
Human capital theory posits a joint relation between human capital, productivity, and income. 
Unfortunately, the productivity-income component seems tenuous at best. But perhaps there 
is still a link between income and human capital? Let’s investigate. 
 
The human-capital-income link has been a Catch-22 for empirical researchers. On the one 
hand, restrictive definitions of human capital correlate poorly with income. On the other hand, 
expansive definitions of human capital are often so vague that they are unmeasurable. The 
first problem was recognized by Jacob Mincer, a pioneer of human capital theory. In his initial 
work, Mincer defined human capital restrictively as the number of years of formal education 
(Mincer, 1958). But he later found that this accounted for a very small portion of income 
variability: 
 
“Simple correlations between earnings and years of schooling are quite weak. 
Moreover, in multiple regressions when variables correlated with schooling 
are added, the regression coefficient of schooling is very small” (Mincer, 
1974). 
 
In the face of this failure, many researchers broadened their definition of human capital in an 
ad hoc manner. For just one example, take Gregory Mankiw’s definition in his bestselling 
microeconomics textbook. He defines human capital expansively as “the accumulation of 
investments in people” (Mankiw, 2012). It is hard to see how this could possibly be measured 
objectively. 
 
What has become common is a bait-and-switch technique. Economists begin with an 
expansive definition of human capital that is unmeasurable. But when it comes to justifying 
the theory, they point to the modest empirical success of a more restrictive definition of 
human capital. Mankiw is a case in point. After offering his expansive definition above, 
Mankiw switches to a more restrictive definition to offer empirical evidence. He writes: 
 
“The most important type of human capital is education. ... Not surprisingly, 
workers with more human capital on average earn more than those with less 
human capital” (Mankiw, 2012). 
 
Of course, Mankiw fails to mention that the correlation between education and earnings is 
low. Still, income gains due to education are invariably used to justify human capital theory. 
Why? 
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Figure 2 Returns to education, age, and experience in the BGH firm 
 
Note: This figure analyzes returns to education, age, and firm experience in the BGH firm from 1969 to 
1985. The vertical axis of each panel shows normalized pay (income relative to firm average pay in the 
year in question). Each data point represents an individual in a given year. Panel A shows income 
returns to years of formal education. Panel B shows income returns with age. Panel C shows income 
returns with years of firm experience. Panel D shows the relation between income and individuals’ 
aggregate human capital stock (see Equation 4). All R
2
 values are from regressions on the logarithm of 
income. Grey regions indicate the 95% prediction interval for each regression. To better visualize 
discrete data, “jitter” has been added to the horizontal axis of Panels A-C. 
 
 
4.1  Education: the only game in town? 
 
It is true that education has a weak effect on income. But it is also true that almost everything 
we can measure about individuals has a weak effect on income (when measured by raw 
correlation). What is important is the relative size of an effect. In relative terms, the income-
effect of education and training is quite strong. This is a fact that heterodox economists often 
begrudgingly concede to human capital theory (even if they do not accept human capital 
theory’s explanation for the returns to education). In this sense, education is treated as the 
only game in town. 
 
But is this actually the case? Does education (and other forms of training) affect income more 
strongly than any other factor? Cracks in this argument were first exposed by Eric Wright 
(1979). Wright found that hierarchical rank within firms affected income more than education. 
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But how general is this result? Because the empirical work on firm hierarchy is quite sparse, it 
is difficult to say. However, the available case-study evidence does not bode well for human 
capital theory. 
 
The most thorough case study of firm hierarchy (to date) was conducted by Baker, Gibbs and 
Holmstrom (1993). I will refer to this as the BGH study. BGH analyze the hierarchical 
structure of a large American firm for a period of two decades, beginning in the late 1960s. 
And unlike other case studies of firm hierarchy, BGH have made their raw data publicly 
available. I analyze the BGH dataset to see if Wright’s results hold up. 
 
Let’s look first at the relation between individual income and years of formal education in the 
BGH firm. Figure 2A plots normalized income (income relative to the firm mean in a given 
year) against years of formal education. As expected there is a positive correlation, but it is 
weak. Next let’s look at age. If we are generous to human capital theory, we can imagine age 
as measure of the human capital accumulated through life experience. As shown in Figure 
2B, incomes increase with age, but the relation is very weak. What about firm experience? 
We can treat firm experience as a measure of on-the-job training and/or acquired skill. Not 
surprisingly, experience at the BGH firm has a significant effect on income (Fig. 2C). 
 
Let’s be generous to human capital theory and further suppose that education, age, and firm 
experience all contribute to an individual’s aggregate stock of human capital, K: 
 
    (4) 
 
How strongly does this aggregate human capital stock affect income? To answer this 
question, we need to provide values for the parameters c1, c2, and c3. These parameters 
weight the various forms of human capital. To my knowledge, human capital theory provides 
no way of determining these parameters. Instead, econometricians typically estimate them 
using multivariate regression. This chooses parameters such that K has the maximum effect 
on income. 
 
Let’s give human capital theory the benefit of the doubt and do this. I estimate Equation 4 
parameters using a multivariate regression on the logarithm of income. I then see how 
strongly K predicts income. The results are shown in Figure 2D. As expected, the aggregate 
human capital stock (K) affects income more strongly than education, age, or firm experience 
in isolation. Aggregate human capital accounts for roughly one third of the variation of log 
income in the BGH firm. 
 
4.2  Returns to hierarchical rank 
 
In the BGH firm, the income-effect of aggregate human capital is sizable. But the problem is 
that it pales in comparison to the effect of hierarchical rank. As shown in Figure 3, hierarchical 
rank accounts for almost two thirds of the variation of log income in the BGH firm. This is 
roughly double the income variation accounted for by our aggregate human capital stock. 
 
But perhaps we are not being fair to human capital theory. It is possible that a large part of the 
returns to hierarchical rank are due to the returns to education, age, and firm experience. 
Conversely, it is possible that none of the returns to education, age, and firm experience are 
due to returns to hierarchical rank. We can untangle this relation using a multivariate analysis. 
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I regress log income onto hierarchical rank, education, age, and firm experience. Table 1 
shows the results. The table values represent the partial correlation between the given factor 
and log income. These values indicate the correlation when the effects of the other factors 
have been removed. 
 
Again, the results do not sit well with human capital theory. The isolated effect of hierarchical 
rank is far larger than any human capital factor. Interestingly, the effect of firm experience 
disappears when we account for changes in hierarchical rank. This suggests that returns to 
firm experience are caused mostly by climbing the corporate ladder. In other words, 
individuals who fail to advance in rank do not have returns to firm experience. 
 
Figure 3 Returns to hierarchical rank in the BGH firm 
 
Note: This figure analyzes returns to hierarchical rank in the BGH firm from 1969 to 1985. The vertical 
axis of each panel shows normalized pay (income relative to firm average pay in the year in question). 
Each data point represents an individual in a given year. The R
2
 value is from a regression on the 
logarithm of income. The grey region indicates the 95% prediction interval of the regression. In order to 
better visualize discrete data, horizontal “jitter” has been added to the horizontal axis. 
 
  
real-world economics review, issue no. 86 
subscribe for free 
 
25 
 
Table 1 A Multivariate analysis of BGH data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Labor productivity inequality vs. income inequality between BGH hierarchical ranks 
 
 
Note: Using a Gini index, this figure compares the inequality of task-specific worker productivity to 
income inequality between BGH hierarchical ranks. Data for worker productivity dispersion comes from 
Hunter et al. (1990). (For methods see Figure 1). Data plotted here shows the distribution of productivity 
inequality for 55 different tasks. I compare this to the income inequality between BGH hierarchical ranks. 
This equals the Gini index of hierarchical rank mean incomes. The blue density curve shows the 
distribution of annual observations. 
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5.  Explaining income returns to hierarchical rank 
 
The BGH evidence suggests that hierarchical rank affects income far more than education 
(and other forms of training/experience). But perhaps this is not a blow to human capital 
theory. Maybe hierarchical rank indicates some unmeasured form of human capital? Let’s 
consider this possibility. 
 
The most general problem with this interpretation is that it has the hallmark of pseudo-
science. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) call this the “unobserved heterogeneity issue”. It is 
always possible to presume that “all pay differences are related to skills (even if these skills 
are unobserved to the economists in the standard data sets)” (ibid). While hinting that this is a 
problem, Acemoglu and Autor go on to state that it is “not a bad place to start when we want 
to impose a conceptual structure on empirical wage distributions” (ibid). I disagree. Karl 
Popper (1959) long ago cautioned against theories that can explain any conceivable 
evidence. To use Wolfgang Pauli’s phrase, such theories are “not even wrong” (Burkeman, 
2005). 
 
But let’s put aside this problem. If hierarchical rank is a form of human capital, what does this 
imply? Human capital theory is very clear that income is proportional to productivity. Thus, 
returns to hierarchical rank must indicate productivity difference between ranks. 
 
But here we run into a problem. Income increases exponentially with hierarchical rank. Are 
these exponential returns really due to productivity gains? Unfortunately, we cannot test this 
directly, since we do not have direct (physical) measures of productivity for the BGH workers. 
What we can do is return to the task-specific productivity inequality shown in Figure 2. To 
reiterate, this is the productivity dispersion among workers doing the same task. I have 
argued that this is the only way to objectively measure individual productivity differences. Can 
this dispersion explain income inequality between BGH hierarchical ranks? 
 
Figure 4 tests this possibility. Here I re-plot the productivity dispersion data from Figure 2.  
I then compare this to the income inequality between BGH hierarchical ranks. To get the 
latter, I calculate the mean income in each hierarchical rank of the firm (in a given year).  
I then calculate the Gini index of these mean incomes. This is equivalent to selecting a 
representative individual from each BGH hierarchical rank, and then measuring the income 
inequality between these individuals. 
 
The results are unambiguous. Income inequality between BGH hierarchical ranks is far 
greater than our measure of productivity dispersion. Thus, it seems improbable that income 
returns to hierarchical rank are due to productivity gains. 
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Figure 5 The exponential growth of hierarchical power with rank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: In an idealized hierarchy, the total number of subordinates (blue) tends to grow exponentially with 
hierarchical rank (red). 
 
5.1  Power, not productivity 
 
If not productivity, then what explains the exponential returns to hierarchical rank? Here, 
human capital theory becomes a barrier to scientific progress. Why? The problem is that 
human capital theory puts the focus squarely on isolated individuals.  
 
As long as we maintain this focus, we are blind to the obvious alternative hypothesis. What if 
income does not result from individual traits? What if income has a social cause? 
 
Once we pose this alternative hypothesis, interesting ideas become possible. For instance, 
returns to hierarchical rank could be a function of power. This puts the focus on relations 
between people (not individual traits). One has power in relation to (and because of) others. 
Think of a military commander. His power is not an individual trait. Rather, it stems from other 
people’s willingness to obey his commands. 
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Figure 6 Average income vs. hierarchical power within case-study firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure shows data from six firm case studies (Audas et al., 2004; Baker et al., 1993; Dohmen 
et al., 2004; Lima, 2000; Morais and Kakabadse, 2014; Treble et al., 2001). The vertical axis shows 
average income within each hierarchical level of the firm (relative to the base level), while the horizontal 
axis shows my metric for average power, which is equal to one plus the average number of 
subordinates below a given hierarchical level. Each point represents a single firm-year observation, and 
color indicates the particular case study. Grey regions around the regression indicate the 95% prediction 
interval. See Fix (2018c) for a detailed discussion of sources and methods. 
 
 
The general study of power is complex, since power can have many forms. But in a hierarchy, 
power is easier to pin down. A hierarchy is a nested set of power relations between superiors 
and subordinates. Each superior wields power over his direct subordinates, but also his 
indirect subordinates. This feature has important consequences. As illustrated by Figure 5, 
the total number of subordinates tends to grow exponentially with hierarchical rank. 
 
But what does this have to do with power? Consider the following Weberian definitions of 
power: 
 
1. “the possibility of imposing one’s will upon the behavior of other persons” (Bendix 1998; 
cited in Wallimann et al. 1977) 
 
2.  “the chance of obtaining the obedience of others to a particular command” (Aron 1964; 
cited in Wallimann et al. 1977) 
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These definitions suggest that power within a hierarchy should be proportional to the number 
of subordinates under one’s control. I put this into formula form as: 
 
    (5) 
 
Everyone starts with a power of 1, meaning they have control over themselves. Hierarchical 
power then increases linearly with the number of subordinates. 
 
The question is, can hierarchical power explain the income returns to hierarchical rank? 
Figure 6 suggests that it can. Here I plot data from six case studies of firm hierarchy. The 
vertical axis indicates average income within each hierarchical rank (of each firm). The 
horizontal axis indicates the average hierarchical power of the rank in question. The result is a 
tight correlation. This suggests that income within these firms is mostly a function of social 
position, rather than individual traits. 
 
The results in Figure 6 beg more questions. Why does this correlation exist? What is the 
mechanism at work? Is it social norms? Rules of thumb? Ideology? Is the correlation unique 
to these firms? Or universal across all firms? Does it change with time? These are all open 
questions. The important point is that these questions will not be posed if we remain fixated 
on human capital theory. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Science is reductionism. However, income distribution theory has tended towards greedy 
reductionism – a term coined by Daniel Dennet. He writes:  
 
“in their eagerness for a bargain, in their zeal to explain too much too fast, 
[greedy reductionists] ... underestimate the complexities, trying to skip whole 
layers or levels of theory in their rush to fasten everything securely and neatly 
to the foundation” (Dennett, 1995). 
 
Human capital theory is greedy reductionist. It offers extremely simple principles that purport 
to explain everyone’s wages, all the time. It posits a universal connection between human 
capital, productivity, and income. But when we look closely at this causal chain, it breaks 
down entirely. For the most part, productivity differences between individuals cannot be 
measured objectively. Studies that claim to find a link between income and productivity do so 
by using circular logic. And when we restrict ourselves to the objective measurement of 
productivity, we find that individual productivity differences are systematically too small to 
account for levels of income inequality. 
 
Furthermore, there is no agreed upon definition of human capital. Most definitions are so 
vague that they are unmeasurable. And when we define human capital restrictively, it can 
account for only a small portion of income variation. The primary empirical justification for 
human capital theory has always been the income returns to education. Yet the available 
evidence suggests that education returns are dwarfed by returns to hierarchical rank. And 
returns to hierarchical rank are so large that they cannot plausibly be explained in terms of 
productivity. 
 
real-world economics review, issue no. 86 
subscribe for free 
 
30 
 
To summarize, the evidence against human capital theory seems damning. And yet human 
capital theory continues to be the dominant theory of personal income distribution. Why? The 
problem is that economists treat human capital theory as though it were true by default. 
Neoclassical economists’ unspoken article of faith is that wages stem from individual traits. All 
evidence is then interpreted as though this were true. If education and on-the-job training 
poorly explain income, this is not a problem. There must be some other skill that we are not 
measuring. Or what if hierarchical rank explains income better than education? Not a 
problem. Hierarchical rank must measure some form of human capital. When we think this 
way, the truth of human capital theory becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
We should not mince words. Human capital theory is a thought virus that is blocking the 
scientific study of income distribution. Alternative hypotheses are needed badly. I believe the 
most promising way forward is to focus on social hierarchy. When we do so, we acknowledge 
that individual income can have a social cause. The beauty of hierarchy is that it is both 
ubiquitous and it is simple enough that we can easily model it. The first step is to study how 
hierarchical rank affects income. This is difficult because the available data is sparse. But by 
using models, we can make estimates. For instance, using an empirically informed model, I 
have found that hierarchical rank affects US income more than any other factor for which data 
is available (Fix, 2018c). I have also found that firm hierarchy may be responsible for 
generating the power-law tail of US income distribution (Fix, 2018b). Hierarchy may even play 
a role in functional income distribution (Fix, 2018a). 
 
These results are promising, but we should admit our state of ignorance. At present, we know 
very little about the role that hierarchy plays in determining income. And we will continue to 
know very little as long as human capital theory dominates the study of income distribution. 
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